Whether a floating object qualifies as a “vessel” under maritime law has important legal and practical ramifications.  For example, a “vessel” can (i) be the basis for maritime jurisdiction, (ii) give rise to Jones Act seaman status for crew members, (iii) be subject to maritime arrest, (iv) be the subject of a limitation of liability act proceeding, and (v) subject a contract to maritime law. While some objects are indisputably vessels (e.g., ships, OSV’s, inland towing vessels, etc.), vessel status is not always so clear and simple.  This is particularly true on the Gulf Coast, where specialized equipment has been developed for use in the oil and gas industry and where the distinction between vessel and non-vessel is often blurred. In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to provide guidance on this important issue when it decided that a floating house was not a vessel. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 568 U.S. 115 (2013). According to commentators, Lozman appeared to change the test for vessel status. But 8 years later, has the test articulated in Lozman actually changed how the courts determine what qualifies as a vessel or did the Supreme Court merely use different words to restate the prior tests for vessel status?